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ABSTRACT 
The financing problems beleaguering the public pension system have again shifted the spotlight onto 
the retirement age. This paper examines the impact of various reform options on the actual retirement 
choices of older workers. The paper focuses in particular on the long-term implications of the changes 
implemented in pension legislation since 1992 and the reform options discussed by the German Social 
Security Reform Commission installed in 2002, the so called “Rürup Commission”. Our simulations 
show that the early-retirement pension adjustment factors introduced by the 1992 pension reform will, 
in the long term, raise the average effective age of retirement for men by somewhat less than two 
years. The across-the-board two-year increase in all the relevant age limits proposed by the “Rürup 
Commission” would raise the effective average age of retirement of men by about eight months. If the 
actuarial adjustment factor is increased from 3.6% to 6% per year, the effective average retirement age 
rises by almost two years. The effects are considerably weaker for women. 
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Pension Reform in Germany: 
The Impact on Retirement Decisions 
By Barbara Berkel and Axel Börsch-Supan 
1 Introduction 
The option of early retirement is a highly-prized, but at the same time highly costly, social 
achievement in Germany. With an increasingly aging population and the precarious financial 
state of the public pension system, these costs are once again the focus of discussion about 
pension reform, especially as the government is committed to taking adjustment measures 
should contributions exceed 20% of gross income in the year 2020 (22% in the year 2030) or 
if net pensions fall below 67%.1 The latest forecasts based on new population and labor force 
projections show that, barring further reform, these two goals are incompatible and further 
reform is required. 
As early retirement imposes additional pressure on the old age dependency ratio2 and thus on 
the financing of the German pension system, the reform discussion has shifted once again to 
the pivotal retirement age, currently age 65, and the earliest possible qualifying age for 
specific forms of retirement pension, currently age 60. Bearing increasing life expectancy in 
mind, raising the age of retirement would appear to be an obvious reform option. This 
alternative is particularly attractive from a financial point of view, as an increase in the age of 
retirement would boost the number of contributors to the system whilst simultaneously 
reducing the number of beneficiaries. What is more, there is no sign that an increase in the age 
of retirement is likely to be prevented by deteriorating health. On the contrary, age-specific 
rates of illness have dropped even faster than mortality rates (Cutler und Sheiner, 1998). 
The aim of this paper is to provide an econometric estimate of the long-term impact of various 
reform options on retirement decisions in Germany, especially on the distribution of actual 
retirement ages and its mean, the effective average retirement age. “Long term” is defined as 
the state of play after all transitional regulations and behavioral changes have taken effect. We 
present a model which relates the actual retirement decisions of older workers, as observed in 
                         
1 See Börsch-Supan (1998, 2000a), Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998), and Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) for 
accounts of the demographic and economic problems confronting the statutory pension scheme. 
2 The number of people of working age relative to the number of people at retirement age. 
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the data provided by the 1984-1997 German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), to the relevant 
statutory pension rules. We then use this model to predict future retirement decisions under 
reformed pension rules. 
Our approach is based on the econometric analysis of Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, Mastrobuoni and 
Schnabel (2003) undertaken in the framework of an international project on the causes and 
implications of early retirement.3 However, in contrast to this international comparative 
analysis, the present paper takes account of the institutional peculiarities applying in Germany 
and, specifically, addresses the 1992 and 1999 reforms as well as the proposals discussed by 
the “Commission for Sustainability in Financing the German Social Security System”, 
referred to in short in the following as the “Rürup Commission”. The Commission’s proposals 
– some of which have been adopted as recommendations, others of which have been rejected 
as reform options – encompass an increase in standard pension ages by one or two years, 
adjustment factors of between 4.5 and 6% per year of earlier retirement, and the introduction 
of individual pension accounts based on the Swedish model.4  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional framework 
determining retirement in Germany. Section 3 looks at the reform options analyzed by us. 
Section 4 presents the data, model specifications, and the results of estimates. Section 5 
discusses the simulations which represent the core aspect of our work. Finally, we present a 
summary of the most important findings. 
2 The German pension system 
The following section describes the German private and public pension system. The private 
pension system or “public retirement insurance” (“Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung”, GRV) 
covers about 85% of the German workforce. Most of these are private sector workers but the 
GRV also includes those public sector workers who are not civil servants. Civil servants, 
about 7% of the workforce, have their own pension system; the self-employed, about 9% of 
the work force, are mainly self-insured although some of them also participate in the public 
retirement insurance system. For the average worker, occupational pensions do not play a 
major role in the German system of old-age provision, neither do individual retirement 
accounts yet, but their importance is increasing since the last reform in 1999/2001.  
                         
3 Refer to the chapter on different countries in Gruber and Wise (1999, 2003a, 2003b). 
4 Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) System, see Section 3. 
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Our sample, taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1984-1997, includes 
only cohorts that enter retirement until 1997. Therefore, in our retrospective econometric 
analysis, we model retirement entry decisions on the basis of the 1972 legislation. Because the 
1992 reform is not fully phased in until 1997 the 1972 legislation is relevant for our sample 
and therefore described in the following section. Where relevant, however, we mention those 
institutional changes which have been legislated in the 1992 and 1999 reforms. We limit our 
description to the possible pathways into retirement, which are particularly relevant for our 
analysis,5 whereas a detailed description of retirement payments, which go into our 
estimations as well, can be found in Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, Mastrobuoni and Schnabel (2003). 
A detailed description of the recent history of institutional changes can be found in Börsch-
Supan and Wilke (2003). 
2.1 Private sector pensions 
First, we describe old age pensions. Until 1972, retirement was mandatory at age 65.  In 1972, 
several early retirement options were introduced, „early“ defined as before age 65, the 
„normal“ retirement age. Since then the system of the GRV pays old age pensions for 
employees from age 60 on if certain conditions are met. A main feature of the German old-
age pensions is “flexible retirement” from age 63 for workers with a long service history.  
Moreover, retirement at age 60 is possible for women, unemployed and workers who cannot 
be appropriately employed for health or labor market reasons.  
In addition, pre-retirement (i.e., retirement before age 60) is possible using other parts of the 
public transfer system, mainly unemployment compensation. Labor force exit before age 60 is 
frequent: about 45% of all men call themselves „retired“ at age 59. Only about half of them 
retire because of disability; the other 50% make use of one of the many official and unofficial 
pre-retirement schemes, i.e. unemployment compensation in combination with severance 
pay.6 
Because of the numerous exceptions that enable retirement entry before age 65, the reforms of 
1992 and 1999 introduced an increase of retirement age limits to age 65.  The system has been 
simplified, because there will be no exceptions for unemployed, part-time employees and 
women anymore.  After a transitional period retirement entry rules of these persons will be 
                         
5 The estimation includes workers, employees and civil servants, whereas the simulation that predicts the impact 
of different reform options on the public retirement insurance, is limited to data of workers and employees. 
6 For a comprehensive illustration of retirement entry rules see also Reimann (2003). 
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adjusted to those of long-time ensured. If adjustment costs (see below) are accepted, long-
time insured can choose early retirement from age 62 on. Similarly disabled people can obtain 
old age pensions at age 63 and with adjustment costs even at age 60. The transitional rules of 
retirement entry are displayed in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Statutory retirement age 
 
Moreover the 1992 reform introduced explicit adjustment costs for retirement before age 65. 
Before 1992, adjustment of benefits to retirement age was only implicit via years of service. 
There were no actuarial adjustments at all. The 1992 social security reform will change this 
stepwise by the year 2004.  Age 65 will then act as the “pivotal age” for benefit computations. 
Table 1 displays the retirement-age-specific adjustments for a worker who has earnings that 
remain constant after age 60.  The table relates the retirement income for retirement at age 65 
to the retirement income for retirement at earlier or later ages, and compares the implicit 
adjustments after 1972 with the total adjustments after the 1992 social security reform is fully 
phased in. As references, actuarially fair adjustments at a 3% discount rate are shown as well.7 
                         
7 A higher discount rate yields steeper adjustments. 
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
Longtime Insured (w ithout
adjustment)
Unemployed/Old-Age Part-
Time (w ithout adjustment)
Women (w ithout
adjustment)
Disabled (w ithout
adjustment)
Longterm Insured
(preretirement w ith
adjustment)
Unemployed/Old-Age Part-
Time/Women (preret. w ith
adjustment)
Disabled (preretirement
w ith adjustment)
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According to the 1992 reform benefits will be reduced by 0.3% per month (maximum 10,8%) 
for each year of earlier retirement.  The 1992 reform also introduced rewards for later 
retirement in a systematic way.  For each year of retirement postponed past the minimum age 
indicated in Table 1, the pension is increased by 0.5% per month or 6% p.a. 
Table 1: Adjustment of public pensions by retirement age 
Pension as a percentage of the pension that one would 
obtain if one had retired at age 65 
age pre-1992a) post-1992b) Actuarial fairc) 
62 100.0 89.2 80,5 
63 100.0 92.8 86,3 
64 100.0 96.4 92,8 
65 100.0 100.0 100,0 
66 107.2 106.0 108,1 
67 114.4 112.0 117,2 
68 114.4 118.0 127,4 
69 114.4 124.0 139,1 
Notes:  a) GRV 1972–1992.  b) GRV after 1992 reform has fully phased in.  c) Evaluated at a 3% discount rate.  
Source: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999). 
Besides old age pensions the contributions to the German retirement insurance also finance 
disability benefits to workers of all ages. These are converted into old age pensions latest at 
age 65.  
The disability pathway provided a frequently used option into early retirement (besides the 
flexible retirement option) before the “pivot age” of 65. A Person who was not able to carry 
on a regular employment received full old age benefits, the so called disability pension 
(“Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente”, EU). A person that could work only half of the time or less 
compared to a healthy person received two-thirds of old age benefits (“Berufsunfähigkeits-
rente”, BU).  In the 1970s and early 1980s, the German jurisdiction has interpreted both rules 
very broadly, in particular the applicability of the first rule. 
The previous rules governing total and partial disability pensions, as well as the special old-
age pension for those aged 60 or over suffering from partial or total disability, were abolished 
in 2001 based on the 1999 Pension Reform Act. However, generous hardship and other 
provisions designed to protect confidence in the system mean that the old rules will continue 
to be effective over a relatively long transitional period (some rules until 2017). After this 
period, insured beneficiaries are still able to draw pension benefits for partial or full disability 
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until the age of 65 but under different conditions.8  One main aspect is that the current labor 
market situation needs not to be taken into account any more. Moreover, if a pension is 
claimed for disability prior to the age of 63, graduated deductions from benefits similar to 
those which apply to old-age pensions payable to the long-term insured will be introduced up 
to the year 2004. The pension adjustment factor for each calendar month for which pension is 
drawn for a partial or full disability prior to age 63 is –0.3% and a maximum of –10.8% (see 
Table 1). 
Besides the above mentioned retirement pathways survivor pensions are paid to spouses if the 
insured husband dies. Survivor pensions are 60% of the husband’s applicable pension for 
spouses that are age 45 and over or if children are in the household („große Witwenrente“), 
otherwise 25% („kleine Witwenrente“). For couples married after the year 2001 a new law 
has to be applied: survivor pensions are not 60% any more but only 55% of the husband’s 
disability pension. In return, however, the number of children is now taken positively into 
account when determining survivor benefits. 
Survivor benefits are a large component of the public pension budget and of total pension 
wealth. Certain earnings tests apply if the surviving spouse has her own income, e.g. her own 
pension. This is only relevant for a very small (below 10%) share of widows. Only since 
recently, male and female survivors are treated symmetrically. Additionally, spouses can 
choose whether to receive a survivor pension or a newly introduced pension-splitting. 
The average retirement age in 1999 was 59.7 years for men and 60.7 years for women. These 
numbers refer to West Germany. In the East, retirement age was 57.9 years for men and 58.2 
years for women. The fraction of those who enter retirement through a disability pension has 
declined and was 29% in 1998. Only about 20% of all entrants used the “normal” pathway of 
an old-age pension at age 65. The most popular retirement age is age 60.9 
2.2 Public sector pensions 
As opposed to employees, civil servants do not pay explicit contributions for their pensions as 
the other employees in the private and public sectors do.10  Instead, the “gross” wage for civil 
servants is lower than the gross wage of other public sector employees with a comparable 
                         
8 They are now referred to as partial or full “Erwerbsminderungsrente (EM)”. 
9 Cf. Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) for a distribution of pathways to retirement over time. 
10 Civil servants are also exempt from unemployment insurance contributions, since civil servants have a life-
time job guarantee. The government pays a certain fraction of health expenses of the civil servant and his or her 
dependents (ranging from 50 to 80%). The rest has to be covered by private insurance.  
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education. The generosity of gross pensions received by civil servants vis-a-vis the private 
sector workers is partially offset by the preferential tax treatment of private sector pensions. 
There are three pathways for civil servants: the standard, the early, and the disability 
retirement option. The standard retirement age is 65. Before July 1, 1997 the early retirement 
age for civil servants was 62 and thus 1 year less than the early retirement age in the social 
security system. In 1997 early retirement age was raised to 63. Adjustment factors for early 
retirement are phasing in linearly between the years 1998 and 2003, and will reach 0.3 
percentage points per month of early retirement, the same as in the private sector.11 
The average retirement age for civil servants in the year 1999 was age 58.9 years and thus 
almost one year lower than in the private sector. Disability is the most important pathway to 
retirement for civil servants: 47% of those who retired in the year 1999 used disability 
retirement. Only about 9% of civil servants retired at the regular retirement age of 65.12 
3 Pension reform scenarios  
As stated in the introduction, this generous system is financially unsustainable due to the 
pressures exerted by the rapid aging process of the German population. Various incremental 
reform steps have been legislated and are currently being phased in, other new reform steps 
are under discussion. The aim of this paper is to estimate the long-term impact of these reform 
measures on the retirement decisions of older workers in Germany. 
We consider six possible reform measures. As a reference scenario, we examine the pension 
reforms already implemented in 1992 and 1999 which, however, will only take effect after a 
long transitional period (Figure 1). We then examine four reform proposals involving higher 
actuarial adjustment factors and higher statutory retirement ages. Finally, we consider how 
retirement probabilities respond to the introduction of an individual pension account system 
based on the Swedish model. These six reform scenarios are defined in more detail in the 
following. 
The core aspects of the reference scenario encompass an increase of the early retirement ages, 
the introduction of actuarial adjustment factors in the 1992 pension reform described in 
Section 2, and the new rules designed to accelerate the implementation of the 1992 reform 
                         
11 Very specific rules apply to some civil servants. E.g., the regular retirement age for police officers is age 60; 
for soldiers it is even lower and depends on their rank. 
12 Cf. “Zweiter Versorgungsbericht der Bundesregierung“, Bundesdrucksache 14/7220, 19.10.2001. 
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which took effect in 1999. We will not predict the transition path. Instead, we simulate the 
long-term impact of the reforms after full implementation. We have modeled the following 
rules for the reference scenario: 
• The adjustment factors for early retirement introduced by the 1992 reform amount to 
3.6% (not exceeding a maximum of 10.8%) for each year of early retirement. The 
adjustment factors introduced in 1992 only began to be implemented on an 
incremental basis subsequent to the period covered by our sample and will only take 
full effect after 2017 (see Figure 1). A long-term insured employee will then only be 
able to take retirement, with a maximum deduction of 10.8%, at the age of 62. 
• Adjustment factors will now also be introduced for each calendar month during which 
an insured person claims a disability pension prior to the age of 63. These adjustment 
factors are the same as those for old-age pensions: 0.3% per month and a maximum of 
10.8%. 
• Reductions in widow/widower’s pensions from 60% to 55% of the spouse’s partial 
disability pension.13  
• “Child-raising pension” and unemployment pensions are no longer effective. The only 
channels now open to all claimants are those of early retirement for the long-term 
insured, the partially or severely disabled. 
This reference scenario describes the retirement probabilities generated if the statutory status 
quo in 2003 remains unchanged and no new reform measures are passed. 
We then compare these outcomes with five reform elements. To begin with we wish to 
examine the effects which higher actuarial adjustment factors have on retirement decisions.14 
• Variant adjustment factor of 4.5%: Compared with the reference scenario which 
provides for adjustment costs of 3.6% p.a., this scenario is based on adjustment costs 
of 4.5% p.a., and a maximum of 13.5%. All the other rules are identical to those in the 
reference scenario. 
• Variant adjustment factor of 6.0%: This scenario introduces adjustment costs of 6.0% 
p.a. (maximum 18%). All other factors remain unchanged. 
                         
13 As our estimates specify the incentives to retire of married people as a unit, we take account of the survivor’s 
pension rules but not of pension splitting. 
14 With regard to the “right level of adjustment factors” see also Ohsmann, Stolz and Thiede (2003). 
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There was no majority in the “Rürup Commission” for these proposed increases in the 
actuarial adjustment factors. The actuarial adjustment is highly unpopular, and the recent 
increase from 0 to 3.6% percent is still not fully phased in, such that little is known about the 
actual response to this recent reform step. 
Next, we examine how a further increase in the statutory regular retirement age would effect 
actual retirement ages. A rule of thumb used by the Federal Ministry for Health and Social 
Security (BMGS) states that, in response to a change in the retirement rules, one third of 
workers retire at the new retirement age, one third continue to retire at the old age of 
retirement and accept the deductions which this implies, and one third avoid the new rules by 
claiming benefits for disability. The next two variants examine the validity of this rule of 
thumb. 
• Variant age limit +1: All the age limits reached after the transition period shown in 
Figure 1 are increased by one year. As a result, the standard pension age, for example, 
is raised from age 65 to 66, and the earliest retirement age for the long-term employed 
from age 62 to 63, etc. Only the contributory periods for old-age pensions of partially 
and fully disabled persons remain unchanged at age 60. 
• Variant age limit +2: Increase in all age limits by 2 years. All other factors remain 
unchanged. This is the proposal submitted by the “Rürup Commission”. 
Finally, as an alternative to these parametric reforms, we model the transition from the current 
defined benefit system to a “notional defined contribution (NDC)” system which, while 
retaining the essential features of the current public pension system, would be, as their 
proponents argue, more sustainable, more flexible, and more transparent.15  Notional defined 
contributions involve an “individual pension accounts system” in which pension entitlements 
would be based on the actual amount of contributions paid in to an otherwise unchanged, i.e. 
pay-as-you-go, pension system. Paid contributions would be accumulated on individual 
pension accounts where they would receive fictive (“notional”) interest based on the rate of 
return provided by the pay-as-you-go system. As a rule, the interest rate would correspond to 
the growth rate of the total wage bill, responding to both demographic and employment 
changes. Assets bearing fictive interest of this type would be converted, on retirement, into a 
lifelong pension annuity based on actuarial calculations. The level of pension would depend 
on remaining life expectancy and would therefore respond to demographic factors. 
                         
15 See Börsch-Supan (2003) and Clemens (2003) regarding the introduction of an NDC system in Germany. 
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• Variant NDC system: In this case we take account of a system which is again based on 
the 1992 and 1999 legislative reforms. The most significant difference between this 
and the reference scenario is the change in the actuarial adjustment factors which are 
implicitly based on the internal rate of interest in the NDC system and remaining life 
expectancy. 
A similar system has been introduced in Sweden about ten years ago.16   A reform package 
along these lines was also passed in Italy in 1995. 
4 Econometric estimation of the incentive effects to retire 
The methodology follows the seminal work by Stock and Wise (1990). They introduced the 
option value as a central incentive variable that captures the impact of pension rules on 
retirement behavior. 
Earlier analyses of the German pension system using this framework were carried out by 
Börsch-Supan (1992), Schmidt (1995), Börsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996), Siddiqui (1997), 
Börsch-Supan (2000b and 2001) and Börsch-Supan, Kohnz and Schnabel (2003). Our work is 
directly linked to the work of Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, Mastrobuoni and Schnabel (2003), 
which is part of an international project about the causes and consequences of early 
retirement. We improve on this work along the following lines: First, we use estimations of 
cumulative retirement entry probabilities instead of hazard rates, which they employ. 
Cumulative retirement entry probabilities turn out to generate more robust estimation results 
for Germany than hazard rates. Second, we employ a broader sample that ascertains a 
representative estimation of retirement entry decisions of German workers and employees. 
Finally, we concentrate on the special features and institutional conditions in Germany and 
simulate the concrete reform options mentioned in section 3 rather than the synthetic 
hypothetical reform proposals in Gruber and Wise’s (2003) international comparisons. 
In the following we will first describe the data and methodology, then the econometric 
estimation procedure and finally our base model estimates.  
                         
16 See Palmer (2000), Settergren (2001) and Wadensjö (2003) for the workings of and initial experiences with 
the Swedish system. 
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4.1 Data and methodology 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel study of some 6,000 
households and some 15,000 individuals.17  The panel started in 1984; 14 waves through 1997 
are used.18  The GSOEP data provide a detailed account of income and employment status. 
We constructed an unbalanced panel of all persons aged 55 through 70 in West Germany for 
which earnings data is available.19  This panel includes 2,223 individuals with 14,401 
observations.  Average observation time is 6.5 years.  The panel is left-censored as we include 
only persons who have worked at least one year during our window in order to reconstruct an 
earning history.20  Aggregate information on average earnings, system entries, and actual 
distribution of retirement age by year is provided by the Association of German Retirement 
Insurance Organizations (“Verband deutscher Versicherungsträger”, VDR).  
Dependent variable 
The variable to be explained is old age labor force status. Because Germany has very few 
part-time employees, we model only two states – fully in labor force and fully retired. The 
definition of  „retired“ is problematic, because there exist different alternatives. Retirement 
definitions commonly employed in the literature include inter alia the retirement status self-
reported by the respondent, the fact that there are few work hours, or the receipt of retirement 
benefits, among other definitions. We use the first concept, which is self-reported status, and 
include pre-retirement, mainly financed by a mixture of unemployment compensation and 
severance pay, in our definition of retirement. 
Explanatory variables 
Our main explanatory variable is the option value established by Stock and Wise (1990). This 
“incentive variable of the retirement decision” evaluates all current and future payments of the 
different retirement pathways less possible contributions that have to be paid, and compares 
these present values to the utility aspect of leisure when being retired. We explain in the 
following how to calculate these present values under different retirement pathways. 
                         
17 Burkhauser (1991) provides an English-language description, code books and links to an internationally 
accessible GSOEP version. Börsch-Supan (2000b) discusses the merits and limits of the GSOEP data for studies 
of retirement behavior. 
18 Ending in 1997 gives us a clean estimate of the actual pension rules in place. 
19 We excluded East Germany because retirement patterns in the East are dominated by the transition problems 
to a market economy.  See Börsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996) for a comparison. 
20 See Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, Mastrobuoni and Schnabel (2003) for a detailed construction of the earnings 
history. 
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Handling of multiple retirement programs 
At least theoretically, a worker at age 55 has the choice between three retirement programs: 
• old-age pensions starting with age 60, 
• disability pensions, and  
• pre-retirement schemes. 
The set of choices is actually larger because some of these programs have several branch 
programs (within old-age pensions: unemployment, long service life, etc.) as was depicted in 
Figure 1. We refer to these choices as “pathways”. It is important to notice that all of these 
pathways pay the same benefit, once a person is eligible.21 
In practice, there is no free choice since most of these pathways are subject to eligibility 
criteria. Among those, we distinguish between “strict eligibility rules” that are tied to 
objective variables such as age, gender and previous contribution history, and “soft eligibility 
rules” that are subject to discretionary decisions22, notably the determination of a workers’ 
disability status.23 
In the construction of social security wealth and the incentive variables, see below, we need to 
compute expected pension benefits which depend on the choice of pathway. In the 
computation of this expected value, we use the observed frequencies as weights. Let’s 
suppose, the observed frequency of disability status at age 59 is 33%, and the sample person 
is not eligible for any other pathway at that age. Then expected benefits at age 59 for this 
person will be a third of the (common) benefit level.24  
Construction of social security wealth 
A key statistic in our computation of budget impacts is the change in the net present value of 
all future benefits when retirement is postponed, (which is the present value of all future 
benefits less contribution payments). In a slight misuse of terminology, we call the net present 
value of all future benefits “social security wealth” (SSW). 
                         
21 Strictly speaking, pre-retirement programs can have any benefit level because they are negotiated between 
workers and employers. In practice, however, the outcome of these negotiations is guided by the public 
insurance benefits. 
22 See Schnabel (1999) for details. 
23 Under the 1972 legislation “disability” depends on health as well as labor market characteristics. 
24 Börsch-Supan (2001) provides an instrumental variables interpretation of this method and explores the 
sensitivity with respect to a more sophisticated choice of instruments. 
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We define social security wealth as the expected present discounted value of benefits (YRET) 
minus applicable contributions that are levied on gross earnings (c·YLAB).  Seen from the 
perspective of a worker who is S years old and plans to retire at age R, social security wealth 
(SSW) is 
SSW R YRET R aS t
t R
t
t S( ) ( )= ⋅ ⋅
=
∞
−∑  δ   -   c YLAB at t
t S
R
t S⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
−
−∑1 δ , 
with: SSW net present discounted value of retirement benefits 
 S planning age, 
        R retirement age, 
 YLABt gross labor income at age t, 
 YRETt(R) net pension income at age t for retirement at age R, 
 ct contribution rate to pension system at age t, 
           at probability to survive at least until age t given survival until age S, 
           δ discount factor = 1/(1+r). 
 
We choose the usual discount rate of 3%. Conditional survival probabilities are computed 
from the standard life tables of the German Bureau of the Census (“Statistisches 
Bundesamt”). SSW depends also on the joint survival probabilities of spouses through 
survivor pensions.25 We assume independence of survival of spouses to compute the joint 
probability. 
We also have to predict future contribution rates and pensions. In order to obtain consistent 
policy simulations, they are simulated using the macroeconomic pension model underlying 
Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999). This internal consistency is important. Assume a policy 
proposal, which reduces the replacement rate by x%. This immediately lowers the 
contribution rates by the same x% if the system is pay-as-you-go and financed through 
contributions. The effect on SSW is ambiguous and varies by cohort. 
The option value of delayed retirement  
Economic incentives to retire also include the value of leisure in retirement. It is captured in 
the option value to postpone retirement (Stock and Wise, 1990). This value expresses for each 
retirement age the trade-off between retiring now (resulting in a stream of retirement benefits 
that depends on this retirement age) and keeping all options open for some later retirement 
date (with associated streams of first labor, then retirement incomes for all possible later 
retirement ages). 
                         
25 For the significance of this extension, see Coile (1999).  
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The option value function adds utility from consumption and leisure to the financial 
incentives.  Let Vt(R) denote the expected discounted future utility at age t if the worker 
retires at age R, specified as follows: 
    Stt
R
St
tS aYLABRV
NET −−
=
⋅⋅=∑ δ )u( )( 1   + α St
Rt
tt aRYRET
−∞
=
⋅⋅∑ δ))(u(  
  
            with YLABtNET after–tax labor income at age t, t = S...R-1, 
  YRETt(R) after–tax pension income at age t, t ≥ R, 
  R  retirement age, 
  α  marginal utility of leisure, to be estimated, 
  at probability to survive at least until age t given survival until S, 
  δ                  discount factor = 1/(1+r). 
 
Utility from consumption is represented by an isoelastic utility function in after-tax income, 
u(Y) = Yγ.  To capture utility from leisure, utility during retirement is weighted by α>1, 
where 1/α is the marginal disutility of work. 
The option value for a specific age is defined as the difference between the maximum 
attainable consumption utility if the worker postpones retirement to some later year minus the 
utility of consumption that the worker can afford if the worker would retire now.  Let R*(s) 
denote the optimal retirement age if the worker postpones retirement past age s, i.e., 
max[Vs(r)] for r>s.  With this notation, the option value is  
      )())(()( * sVsRVsG ss −= . 
 
Since a worker is likely to retire as soon as the utility of the option to postpone retirement 
becomes smaller than the utility of retiring now, retirement probabilities should depend 
negatively on the option value. 
The option value captures the economic incentives created by the pension system and the 
labor market because the retirement income YRETt(R) depends on retirement age according 
to the adjustment factors in Table 1 and on previous labor income by the benefit 
computations.26  
                         
26 Benefits are computed on a life-time contribution basis. They are the product of four elements: (1) the 
employee’s relative wage position, averaged over the entire earnings history, (2) the number of years of service 
life, (3) several adjustment factors, and (4) the average pension level. For more details see Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, 
Mastrobuoni and Schnabel (2003). 
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We compute the option value for every person in our sample, using the applicable pension 
regulations and the imputed earnings histories. The parameters chosen are a discount rate δ of 
3%, a curvature parameter γ of 1.0, and a relative utility parameter α of 2.8 (Börsch-Supan, 
Kohnz, Mastrobuoni and Schnabel 2003). Additional private pension income is ignored 
because it represents only a very small proportion of retirement income in Germany. 
Other explanatory variables 
Besides the option value and the social security wealth, the usual socio-demographic variables 
such as age, gender and marital status are incorporated in our regression analysis. The 
complexity of possible age effects is modeled by a set of age-specific dummy variables. 
Moreover, we include wealth (indicator variables of several financial and real wealth 
categories) and a self-assessed health measure.  We do not use the legal disability status as a 
measure of health since this is endogenous to the retirement decision.  The desire for early 
retirement may prompt workers to seek disability status, and frequently the employer helps in 
this process to alleviate restructuring.  Until recently, disability status was granted for labor 
market reasons without a link to health. 
4.2 Econometric estimation method 
We estimate a decision model with labor status “retired” as dependent variable that covers 
normal retirement as well as different forms of early retirement. We link the explanatory 
variables to the dependent variable by a binary probit model. Using this simple functional 
form has two disadvantages from a theoretical point of view. 
First, a cross-sectional probit model does some injustice to the panel nature of our data and 
probably underestimates the true effect, see Börsch-Supan (2001), who experiments with 
several specifications of panel probit models with parametrized correlation patterns over time. 
He demonstrates that the effects of the incentive variables are slightly strengthened, however, 
the results did not change significantly.  
Second, the probit functional form ignores the structure of the dynamic optimization that 
underlies the workers decision when to retire.27 Inserting the option value in this type of a 
regression model, however, can be interpreted as a flexible discrete-time duration model 
explaining the timing of retirement entry. Previous experimentation has shown that this 
pragmatic approach generates robust estimates of the average effects of the incentive 
                         
27 The full underlying dynamic programming model has been estimated by Rust and Phelan (1997). 
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variables on retirement, although it is likely to fail predicting the individual variation as 
precisely as the true dynamic optimization model. 
In order to correct for possible sample bias we weight the dependent variable, the 
observations of retired and non-retired persons, by aggregate sample frequencies computed 
from the VDR statistics which include all retirement entries of the public retirement insurance 
system.28  Therefore, after scaling our sample using age specific weights we are able to 
reproduce representative retirement probabilities for our base model based on the 1972 
legislation.  
Our estimation approach is slightly different from the one applied in Gruber and Wise (2003a 
and b). The international comparisons in Gruber and Wise use the probability to enter 
retirement (the hazard rate) as a dependent variable, which is the probability to be retired, 
given that the sample person has worked during the year before. Therefore, they include 
repeated observations of the same person only while this person is employed.  
In contrast, our estimation sample includes repeated observations of the same person while 
this person is employed and retired, since retirement is not necessarily an absorbing state. 
Hence, our dependent variable is the probability to be retired, given that the sample person 
has worked until the beginning of our window period (age 53): 
pt = Prob(retired in t | worked until 53), 
which is the cumulative distribution function. Given the estimated probability of being retired, 
we then compute the probability to retire, given that the sample person has not been retired 
before, as the differences of the cumulative distribution function at each age between 54 and 
72: 
qt = pt - pt-1 = Prob(retired in t | not retired in t-1). 
The probability of choosing a retirement age a is then qa and the expected retirement age is 
Σ qa·a.  
We compared both estimation approaches. For Germany the estimated and simulated 
cumulative probabilities of retiring are more robust than those estimated by a hazard model.29 
                         
28 “Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen” various issues. 
29  More “robust” in the following sense: The methodology in Gruber and Wise (2003a and b) produces quite a 
few individual negative retirement probabilities when they are computed from the hazards since no adding up 
constraint is imposed on several observations of the same individual in our panel data. This is not the case in our 
approach, although we also ignore the implicit adding up constraints when computing qt = pt - pt-1. 
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4.3 Base model estimates 
Table 2 shows full regression results. A positive coefficient indicates that the explanatory 
variable increases the probability of being retired. In addition to the option values, health and 
an array of socio-economic variables, we include a full set of age dummies to non-
parametrically capture all other unmeasured effects on the retirement decision that are 
systematically related to age. Because of the different employment histories of men and 
women resulting in very different claims on the retirement insurance and different incentives 
to retire, we have separate regressions for males and females. 
The incentive variable (option value) and the set of age dummies are highly significant for 
both male and female. For males the age dummies clearly elevate the probabilities to retire 
after ages 60, 63 and 65, the earliest retirement ages under the various pathways. Self-reported 
health is also highly significant: healthier workers retire substantially later than those males 
who report poor health. 
Married males do not have a different retirement behavior than single males. However, if 
there is (still) a child in the household retirement is more likely to be deferred. The effect of a 
college degree on retirement age is very strong and is present although we have an income 
measure as an additional control.  
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Table 2: Regression output 
  Males Females 
Variable  Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
Optval  -0.0059 0.0013 0.000 -0.0032 0.0008 0.000 
Social security wealth  -0.0024 0.0008 0.004  0.0009 0.0005 0.104 
Social sec. wealth, sqrd.  0.0005 0.0003 0.103 -0.0000 0.0020 0.904 
Age=55  0.3625 0.2203 0.100 0.3051 0.1306 0.020 
Age=56  0.6844 0.2145 0.001 0.4446 0.1306 0.001 
Age=57  0.5875 0.2169 0.007 0.5508 0.1313 0.000 
Age=58  0.5806 0.314 0.012 0.5793 0.1349 0.000 
Age=59  0.5704 0.2488 0.022 0.5816 0.1379 0.000 
Age=60  1.4219 0.2731 0.000 2.0101 0.1474 0.000 
Age=61  1.6412 0.2818 0.000 2.1777 0.1532 0.000 
Age=62  1.7481 0.2835 0.000 2.2630 0.1625 0.000 
Age=63  2.1266 0.2821 0.000 2.3174 0.1782 0.000 
Age=64  2.4431 0.3063 0.000 2.2424 0.1782 0.000 
Age=65  3.7217 0.2826 0.000 3.9161 0.1852 0.000 
Age=66  3.8238 0.3478 0.000 3.9738 0.2246 0.000 
Age=67  4.0512 0.4963 0.000 3.9634 0.2594 0.000 
Age=68  3.3760 0.3962 0.000 4.0071 0.2690 0.000 
Age=69  3.9929 0.4532 0.000 4.2637 0.2807 0.000 
Age=70  4.3736 0.5045 0.000 4.3696 0.3374 0.000 
Age=71  4.5816 0.5141 0.000 4.8642 0.37988 0.000 
Age=72  5.3190 0.4838 0.000 6.2926 0.4182 0.000 
Health status  -0.1326 0.01311 0.000 -0.1447 0.01566 0.000 
Married  -0.1265 0.1450 0.383 -0.9660 0.1118 0.000 
University degree  -0.5660 0.2695 0.036 -1.0109 0.2228 0.000 
Skill  -0.1406 0.0931 0.134 -0.1203 0.0600 0.045 
Homeownership  0.3670 0.0800 0.000 -0.1927 0.0602 0.001 
No financial assets  -0.1681 0.1486 0.258 -0.1420 0.942 0.132 
Financial securities  0.2272 0.0876 0.010 0.1418 0.0682 0.038 
Period of insurance  0.0350 0.0247 0.156 0.0460 0.0092 0.000 
Period of insurance squ.  -0.0007 0.0004 0.094 -0.0008 0.0002 0.000 
Income  0.0113 0.0098 0.251 0.0117 0.0049 0.017 
Income squared  0.0001 0.0001 0.063 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
Owner occup.  -0.4578 0.1702 0.007 -0.7856 0.1276 0.000 
Civil service  0.6214 0.1561 0.000 0.9769 0.2891 0.001 
Kids  -0.3633 0.0867 0.000 -0.0777 0.0651 0.233 
Constant  0.0372 0.4834 0.939 -0.1622 0.2238 0.469 
No. of obs.   2321   4206  
Source: GSOEP, working sample, 1984-1997. 
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The wealth effects on retirement are weak and barely significant: persons with higher wealth 
(homeownership, financial assets) afford an earlier retirement. Also higher labor income 
weakens labor force attachment. Note that the higher opportunity costs of retirement have 
already been accounted for in the option value variable and in the wealth variables. Hence, 
this income effect is over and above those variables and therefore only significant for income 
squared at the 10% level.  
Two dummy variables are indicating the former labor force status. These variables take the 
value one if the person is currently (or used to be) self employed or a civil servant. The model 
indicates that self employed tend to work longer, while civil servants retire earlier, even after 
all other variables such as pension rules and income levels have been accounted for. 
For females the peaks of the age dummies are much more pronounced at age 60 and 65, in 
accordance an accentuation of habitual effects over and above the economic incentives 
created by different pension rules for women. Most socio-economic variables have similar 
(but weaker) effects compared with the male sample. Different, however, is the effect of being 
married: married women retire later, probably because they have raised children and therefore 
an interrupted earnings record such that they are not yet eligible for retirement at age 60. 
5 Simulations of reform variants 
We now apply the estimated coefficients to several simulation experiments mentioned in 
section 3. We first simulate the 1992 and 1999 reform as our reference scenario such as if 
they were already fully implemented. Note that until 1997, the end of our sample period, the 
rules of the 1992 pension reform have not been fully phased in. On top of the reference 
scenario we simulate the implementation of different actuarial adjustment factors and a 
change in the regular statutory retirement age of 65 by one or two years. Finally we 
demonstrate the impact of installing a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) System.  
We apply the parameter values estimated in Section 4.3 to each reform scenario to calculate 
the retirement probabilities for the ages 54 to 72, based on the assumption that an employee 
has previously worked up to the age of 53. We calculate the incentive variables implicit in 
each reform scenario, i.e. a new option value and a new social security wealth for each of the 
individuals in our sample. The age indicators in the scenarios involving an increase in 
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retirement age are also increased by one or two years in the forecast as these capture the 
habitual effect of, for example, the statutory pension age. 
Our results are shown in Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3. Table 3 summarizes the key data for the 
distribution of retirement ages, separately for men and women – i.e. the average retirement 
age and the percentage of people retiring before the ages of 60, 62 or 65.  
The overall distribution of new retirees is shown in diagrammatic form in Figures 2 und 3, 
again separately for men and women. The graphs on the left show the distribution of 
retirement ages, i.e. the probability that a person will enter retirement at a specific age. The 
graphs on the right show the accumulated retirement probabilities, i.e. the probability with 
which a person of a specified age has retired, for each age. Our calculations include all people 
retiring between the ages of 54 and 72 who draw an old-age pension or disability benefits. 
We first present the results for male workers and then refer to the tables and charts to discuss 
how the introduction of actuarial adjustment factors and the changes in initial retirement rules 
impact the number of people entering retirement. 
Based on the status quo established by the 1972 reform – i.e. the main provisions affecting the 
people in our observation period - the full implementation of the 1992 and 1999 reforms 
would lift the average male retirement age by almost two years from age 61.2 to 63. The 
impact on women, as shown below, is much weaker. An increase in the average age of 
retirement is thus foreseeable in the future on the basis of existing legislation alone and is 
already apparent in the latest figures issued by the VDR (Reimann, 2003). 
An upward shift in the entire fabric of age limits by two years increases the average effective 
retirement age for men by a further 9 months from age 63 to 63.7.  Figure 2 (below left) 
clearly illustrates how the two ages at which most insured persons retire – at age 60 or 65 – 
increase by two years. However, some people draw benefits for loss of earning capacity or put 
up with the actuarial deductions attached to earlier retirement rather than going along with 
this shift in age limits. The resulting increase in the effective age of retirement is somewhat 
greater than suggested by the BMGS rule of thumb referred to in Section 3. 
The introduction of higher adjustment factors also has a very distinctive impact on retirement 
decisions. Deductions of 4.5% increase the average retirement age by nine months from age 
63 to 63.7.  Deductions of 6% have a considerably stronger incentive effect and even lift the 
average retirement age up to age 64.9.  As shown by Figure 2, more people retire at age 65 
and fewer at age 60 or 61.  
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Table 3: The impact of different reform options on retirement age 
 
Mean 
retirement-
age 
Percentage 
of persons 
who retire 
before age 
60  
Percentage 
of persons 
who retire 
before age 
62 
Percentage 
of persons 
who retire 
before age 
65 
Men:     
1972 legislation 61,2 * 17,2 % 58,2 % 81,9 % 
Pension reforms 1992 + 1999 63,0 4,7 % 42,4 % 51,7 % 
... plus adjustment costs of 4,5% 63,7 3,2 % 31,3 % 37,4 % 
... plus adjustment costs of 6% 64,9 2,1 % 18,6 % 20,0 % 
... plus „pivotal age“ +1 year 63,3 5,8 % 26,0 % 52,6 % 
... plus „pivotal age“ +2 years 63,7 7,2 % 11,3 % 53,4 % 
NDC System 65,3 2,3 % 19,2 % 19,4 % 
Women:     
1972 legislation 61,7* 10,8 % 58,6 % 66,9 % 
Pension reforms 1992 + 1999 62,4 6,3 % 52,4 % 54,8 % 
... plus adjustment costs of 4,5% 62,7 5,3 % 48,6 % 50,1 % 
... plus adjustment costs of 6% 63,2 4,1 % 42,0 % 42,9 % 
... plus „pivotal age“ +1 year 62,6 6,7 % 42,8 % 55,0 % 
... plus „pivotal age“ +2 years 62,3 6,9 % 9,4 % 55,1 % 
NDC System 63,3 4,2 % 41,8 % 41,8 % 
*) These values correspond to the mean retirement age calculated from the VDR statistics of 1995, based on old 
age pensions and disability entries for all persons aged 54 to 72. 
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Figure 2: Predicted distribution of retirement ages, men  
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Figure 3: Predicted distribution of retirement ages, women 
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Women respond less strongly than men to a shift in age limits. Under the 1972 pension 
legislation, the average age of retirement for women is age 61.7 and will only rise by 0.7 
years to age 62.4 when all the Riester and 1999 pension reform rules are implemented in full.  
A shift in the entire fabric of age limits for women by one year produces a postponement of 3 
months and the average age of retirement moves up from age 62.4 to 62.6.  A shift of two 
years is accompanied by a stronger drift towards disability benefits; the average age of 
retirement in this scenario is only 62.3, and thus remains to all intents and purposes 
unchanged. 
This behavior is very clearly illustrated by Figure 3 (below left): In the basic scenario, most 
women retire between the ages of 60 and 65. A shift in the age limits by one (or two) years 
also postpones the bulk of retirements among women by the same one (or two) year period. 
However, not everybody retires later; some people claim disability benefits earlier (the second 
“peak” flattens out as the age limits are progressively increased, while the first “peak” rises). 
This is the primary effect for women.  
The incentive effect of higher adjustment factors is also weaker for women: a deduction of 
4.5% increases the average age of retirement by 3 months from age 62.4 to 62.7.  A deduction 
of 6% increases the average retirement age by six months to age 63.2.   
Finally, our simulations demonstrate that the introduction of the NDC system would also have 
a major impact on the average age of retirement in comparison with the Riester and 1999 
reforms (refer to Table 3). The average age of retirement increases by more than two years for 
men from age 63 to 65.3 and less dramatically by almost one year for women from age 62.4 
to 63.3. Of the five reform elements examined, this variant generates the highest average 
retirement age and, as such, evidently has the most powerful incentive effects. As 
demonstrated by Figures 2 and 3, the distribution of new retirements is similar to that in the 
scenario involving higher adjustment factors. This applies equally to men and women.  
This is hardly surprising given that the NDC system in fact differs both in technical respects 
and from the underlying transfer philosophy of the pay-as-you-go system. However, as the 
earnings points rules embodied in the German PAYG system resemble fairly closely the 
actuarial principle of equivalence between contributions and benefits, the main difference 
between the two systems is that the NDC system includes adjustment factors which are 
actuarially fair and thus considerably higher than in the reference scenario. 
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It is important to bear in mind that the estimates summarized in this paper are based on the 
behavior of employees and employers from the mid-1980s to 1990s. The future behavior 
particularly of female workers may well change significantly, i.e. more closely resemble that 
of male workers, in the period 2005 to 2025 to which the projections in this paper apply. 
6 Summary and conclusions 
The accelerating process of population aging will have a momentous impact on the financial 
sustainability of the German pay-as-you-go pension system. The increase in the old age 
dependency ratio means that the pensions of a growing number of people at retirement age 
will have to be financed by a smaller workforce. Quite apart from these demographic 
problems, there are also strong incentive effects favoring early retirement built into the 
German pension system; these incentives increase the old age dependency ratio even more 
than would be dictated by demographic factors alone. 
We have modeled and estimated the influence of pension legislation on retirement decisions 
in Germany. Retirement probability is summarized as a function of an incentive variable 
which encompasses pension legislation and other control variables. As incentive variables we 
use the option value of postponing retirement by one year. This model is then used to simulate 
various reforms to the retirement rules: the 1992 and 1999 reforms, as well as a range of 
reform variants offered for discussion by the “Rürup Commission”, including an increase in 
standard retirement age limits, in the actuarial adjustment factors, and the implementation of a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) system modeled after the Swedish pension system. 
Our calculations show that the introduction of an actuarial adjustment factor of 3.6% p.a. and 
other changes to the retirement rules already introduced by the 1992 and 1999 reforms will, 
over the next few years, increase the average effective retirement age for men by almost two 
years and that for women by a considerably lower period of almost 9 months. 
A shift in the structure of age limits as a whole by a further two years would postpone the 
effective retirement age of men by, on average, around 9 months, and would have little or no 
effect on the retirement age of women. Alternatively, an increase of the actuarial adjustment 
factor from 3.6% to 6% would increase the average age of retirement by almost 2 years. This 
effect would be considerably weaker for women, nevertheless, their average age of retirement 
would increase by around one year. 
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These results illustrate that an increased actuarial adjustment factor and an increase in the 
retirement age based on higher remaining life expectancy offer major potential for postponing 
the effective age of retirement. From an economic perspective, these policy options offer 
suitable measures in order to regain financial sustainability of the German pay-as-you-go 
public pension system. 
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